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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a negligence action brought by plaintiff-
driver against the driver of the other automobile to recover 
damages for an unusual medical condition allegedly caused by 
the collision. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was submitted to the jury on the issue of 
whether the accident caused the medical condition of which 
plaintiff complained. The jury returned a verdict of "no 
cause of action". Plaintiff moved for a new trial pursuant to 
Rule 59 (a) (3) on the ground that he was surprised by the 
testimony of Defendant's expert medical witness. The Third 
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah, Judge G. 
Hal Taylor presiding, denied plaintiff's motion. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks affirmation of the trial judge's 
~der denying plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 16, 1974, a Cadallic driven by the plaintiff, 
Reid E. Jensen, was struck from the rear by a vehicle driven 
by defendant Connie Gail Thomas. Although the facts show that 
there was no visible damage to plaintiff's automobile and 
only very minor damage to defendant's Volkswagen, plaintiff 
claimed that he suffered severe injuries arising out of this 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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l 
accident. Whether or not plaintiff's medical condit1· 0 n was 
caused by this accident became the chief issue at trial. 
Plaintiff had a history of medical problems. He was 
wounded and knocked unconscious during World War II. [R. 301] 
His service related injuries caused him to receive a thirty 
per cent (30%) disability rating from the government. [R. JlJ] 
In August, 1966, he suffered a severe heart attack. [R. 313] 
Since 1966, plaintiff has been undergoing treatment for the 
condition of hardening of the arteries (arteriosclerosis). 
[R. 336] In 1970 he was involved in the first of three rear· 
end automobile collisions when his vehicle was struck by 
another car. [R. 313] From this first accident, plaintiff 
suffered a cervical sprain, [R. 313] followed by numbness in 
his extremities and headaches. [R. 314] In 1970, plaintiff 
also became aware that he was suffering from Raynaud' s Pheno· 
mena. [R. 315] This condition affects the circulation to his 
extremities. [R. 386] On June 19, 1971, plaintiff had his 
second severe heart attack [R. 317, 339], resulting from a 
condition of blockage of the coronary arteries. [R. 339] 
This heart attack combined with the Raynaud' s Phenomena caused 
him to retire. [R. 317] In 1972 plaintiff had an open-heart 
coronary by-pass surgery. [R. 318, 389] Plaintiff underwent 
more surgery in 1973 when a lower rib and two sections of nerve I 
I 
ganglia were removed in order to alleviate problems in ! 
-2- I 
_.... 
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his lower extremities stemming from his Raynaud's Phenomena. 
[R. 318] Then in June 1974, plaintiff and defendant were 
involved in the accident which is the subject of this law 
suit. Subsequently on July 29, 1976, plaintiff was involved 
in yet another rear-end collision. [R. 318] 
Prior to trial plaintiff claimed that the accident 
with defendant had aggrevated his Raynaud's Phenomena and also 
caused him to suffer from a condition known as Transient 
Ischemia Attack (hereinafter "TIA"). TIA is a "mini-stroke" 
which is caused by the blood flow to the brain being tempor-
arily interrupted. [R. 365] This results in a brief loss of 
brain function including vision. [R. 365-366] 
Through discovery, plaintiff found that defendant 
intended to call Dr. Edward J. Hershgold as an expert medical 
witness. [R. 85] Dr. Hershgold had examined the plaintiff at 
defendant's request. Dr. Hershgold stated in his letter dated 
May 14, 1976, that he could not "trace a direct connection 
between his [plaintiff's] history of so-called whiplash injury 
and the Raynaud' s. " [R. -- two unnumbered pages between R. 226 
and R. 227] . 
On June 1, 1976, plaintiff deposed Dr. Hershgold. 
After the deposition, plaintiff's attorney informed defendant's 
attorney that he did not intend to claim that the accident of 
June, 1974, had aggrevated the plaintiff's Raynaud's Phenomena. 
-3-
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Prior to the trial, defendant's attorney advised 
plaintiff's attorney that he still intended to call Dr. Hersh-
gold as a witness. 
At trial plaintiff called Dr. Van Dyke (through 
videotape deposition) as one of his expert medical witnesses. 
On cross-examination Dr. Van Dyke testified that it would be 
very difficult for him to know whether the neck injury from 
the 1970 accident or the 1974 accident was primarily respon-
sible for plaintiff's TIA [R. 383]; and that plaintiff's heart 
problems had a bearing on his TIA condition since "a defective 
heart would not put out proper amounts of blood" and "a defec-
tive heart can also be the source of little clots which break 
off and shoot out, you know, into arteries. II [R. 387] Dr. 
Van Dyke also testified that the single most important cause 
of TIA is hardening of the arteries, [R. 408, 412) and that in 
every one of the 25 to 30 TIA patients he has treated within 
the last two years, the TIA was related to disease of the 
vascular system and not to injury to the neck. [R. 414-415] 
The following answer from plaintiff's own medical expert is 
most revealing: 
DEFENDANTS ATTORNEY: Would it be a fair sta::- 1 
. . . h use of n1s I ment to say that in all probability t e ca arteries: 
particular problem would be hardening of the 
DR. VAN DYKE: Yes. [R. 415] 
During the presentation of her case, defendant 
-4-
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called Dr. Hershgold as an expert medical witness. [R. 232] 
Defendant's attorney questioned Dr. Hershgold in two areas: 
(1) Dr. Hershgold was questioned concerning 
his findings from his examination relating to plain-
tiff's arteriosclerotic condition; and 
(2) Dr. Hershgold was questioned concerning 
the fact that at no time during the medical exam of 
plaintiff in May 1976 did plaintiff complain of any 
visual disturbances which are the main symptoms of 
TIA. 
During his direct examination, defendant's attorney 
did not ask Dr. Hershgold to state an opinion regarding whether 
or not the accident of 1974 caused plaintiff's TIA. His 
testimony on direct examination went to his findings and 
observations during his examination of the plaintiff. His 
diagnosis of arteriosclerosis corroborated testimony that had 
already been received into evidence from Dr. Van Dyke, plain-
tiffs own medical witness. However, on cross-examination, 
Plaintiff's attorney opened this area up by asking if Dr. 
Hershgold had an opinion on causation: 
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY: As a matter of fact you 
have no opinion on whether or not his -- one way or 
other whether his transient ischemic attacks were 
caused by the arteriosclerosis or something else? 
DR. HERSHGOLD: I have an opinion on that. 
-5-
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PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY: You have an opinion? 
DR. HERSHGOLD: Oh, yes. [R. 246] 
Plaintiff's attorney did not ask Dr. Hershgold to 
state his opinion, so on redirect examination defendant's 
attorney asked the Doctor what his opinion was. [R. 25l] 
?\<:1.iMi.ff·~ 
objection was overruled by the court. [R. 251] 
Dr. Hershgold stated that in his opinion, plaintiff's TIA is 
due to his blood-vessel disease. [R. 251-252] 
At the close of all the evidence the court directed 
a verdict against the defendant on negligence. [R. 176] The 
case was submitted to the jury on the issue of whether or not 
the negligence of the defendant was a proximate cause of 
plaintiff's medical problems. [R. 176] 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant-· 
no cause of action [R. 188) Plaintiff thereupon moved for a 
new trial pursuant to rule 59 (a) (3) Utah Rules of Civil Proce· 
dure on the ground that he was surprised by Dr. Hershgold's 
testimony. [R. 227] Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial was 
denied by the court. [R. 263) Plaintiff filed a Notice of 
Appeal. 
I. 
[R. 264) 
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF CANNOT CLAIM THAT HE WAS 
SURPRISED BY AN EXPERT WITNESS'S RESPONSE TO~ 
OPINION QUESTION WHICH HE ASKED. 
t t wo theorie' Plaintiff initially intended to presen 
of injury at trial. The first theory was that the accidenr 
-6-
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caused plaintiffs TIA. The second theory was that the collision 
caused plaintiff's problems with Raynaud's Phenomena. Defen-
dant retained Dr. Hershgold, a hematologist and circulartory 
specialist, to conduct an independent medical examination of 
the plaintiff. Subsequent to the exam, plaintiff took Dr. 
Hershgold' s deposition. After the deposition plaintiff's 
attorney informed defendant's attorney that plaintiff would 
not claim any causal relationship between the automobile 
~llision and the Raynaud's Phenomena, and that plaintiff 
would proceed on the sole theory that the accident caused 
plaintiff's TIA. [R. 257] Such a change in strategy by the 
plaintiff did not affect the defendant's list of witnesses, 
and prior to trial plaintiff's attorney specifically told defen-
dant's attorney that Dr. Hershgold would still be called as one 
of defendant's expert witnesses. 
At trial plaintiff called Dr. Van Dyke as an expert 
medical witness. On cross-examination, Dr. Van Dyke testified 
concerning the causal relationship between the arteriosclerosis 
and TIA. [supra pg. 4] Since this testimony had been taken by 
videotape deposition before trial, plaintiff's attorney obvi-
ously knew what the testimony of his own witness would be. He 
also knew or should have known that plaintiff's arteriosclerosis 
would be an issue at trial. 
In her case in chief defendant called Dr. Hershgold 
Prima · 1 
ri Y for the purpose of corroborating Dr. Van Dyke's 
-7-
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testimony regarding arteriosclerosis. Dr Hersh ld 
· go simply 
testified to his findings regarding plaintiff's arteriosclero: .. 
condition made during the independent medical examination. 
This testimony came in without objection by plaintiff• s attor~' 
(R. 234-238] Then defendant's attorney started to question Dr. 
Hershgold regarding complaints plaintiff voiced during the 
examination. [R. 238] At that point plaintiff objected and 
the following colloquy was held outside the presence of the 
jury. 
MR. DeBRY: You indicated that Dr. Hershgold 
would be a witness, and therefore at our expen~, 
our time, we took Dr. Hershgold' s deposition and we 
asked by Interrogatory who you intended to call. 
And you indicated by Answer to Interrogatory that 
you intended to call Dr. Hershgold on the issue of 
Raynaud' s. And therefore we went to the time -- we 
went to the expense to interrogate him on that 
issue. Now, that issue has never been brought up in 
this case. And we are completely got by surprise 
and completely prejudiced. And there is no way thac 
I can properly protect my client, represent my 
client when we haven't had a chance to interview or ' 
take a deposition of this witness beyond the scope 
of the Raynaud's problem. 
And if the interrogation goes beyond the scope 
of the Raynaud' s problem, it is no issue in this 
case. 
THE 
was part 
history. 
COURT: Well, at this point the only. qu~sti: 
of laying a foundation as to his med1ca 
That can't surprise you. 
MR. DeBRY: Well, I presume that he is leading 
up to -- I don't know what he is leading up to._t~ 
That's the point. I have never taken his deposi ~· 
THE COURT: Why object at this stage? 
MR. NEBEKER: Let me just state, Your Hon~« 
what Dr. Hershgold will testify to is basicall 1 
- 8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
he has said. And that is whenever you have had a 
hardening of the arteries condition that you have 
these little platelets in the blood which break off 
and that is what causes normally this particular 
problem that we have here. Now, that's the extent 
of his testimony basically. 
MR. DeBRY: Let me indicate that's completely 
immaterial unless you want this witness to give his 
expert opinion that in this case he has examined him 
and in his expert opinion that caused it to a reason-
able medical probability. If you want him to give a 
text book answer in some ethereal abstract sense, 
sometimes arteriosclerosis causes it and sometimes 
that causes Raynaud's, that permits the Jury to 
speculate. 
MR. NEBEKER: I think where Dr. Van Dyke has 
testified to these same facts, he has already testified 
to this condition that this man has arteriosclerosis, 
that it can cause this particular problem. In fact 
he said it would have to be taken into account. Dr. 
Hershgold is merely buttressing that opinion given 
by Dr. Van Dyke this is what happens. 
Mr. DeBRY: So I am not prejudiced and I didn't 
have a chance to interrogate him. Where is your 
testimony going to go? 
MR. NEBEKER: It's going to go to support the 
statement from Van Dyke. 
MR. DeBRY: That what? 
MR. NEBEKER: That arteriosclerosis 
MR. DeBRY: Sometimes causes --
MR. NEBEKER: -- that some -- Dr. Van Dyke said 
it has to be taken into account as a factor. And I 
think Dr. Hershgold can testify it's the same thing. 
He is just testifying to the same facts basically 
that Dr. Van Dyke is. 
MR. DeBRY: Well then, I will object on the 
basis that there is no foundation and that this is 
permitting the witness and the Jury to speculate 
unless he wants to give his opinion as to whether or 
-9-
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not the a~cident caused this man's TIA or wheth , 
the arteriosclerosis caused it, but this abst ~ 
· · d rac, question is angerous for the Jury. 
THE COURT: Proximate cause is for the Jury. 
MR. NEBEKER: That's right, Your Honor. We 
have a Supreme Court case where the Supreme court 
said that even in the case where there was testimo· 
in something like thirty percent of the cases in ·· 
some kind of an injury, that this was for the Jm 
to determine whether or not that testimony -- · 
THE COURT: Once you have laid the foundation .. 
what is your ultimate question that you are going'. 
ask the Doctor? 
MR. NEBEKER: I am merely going to ask him 
if 
THE COURT: Are you going to pose a hypothetic;. 
MR. NEBEKER: No. I am merely asking him to 
testify to the fact that when he saw Mr. Jensen he 
had this condition of arteriosclerosis, that that 
condition is something that gives rise to this 
problem of having these platelets break off. They 
can travel to the brain and cause these mini stroke: 
THE COURT: He has already testified to that. 
MR. NEBEKER: He has already testified to that 
I just wanted to ask him whether or not when Mr. 
Jensen came in in May of 1976, whether or not he .. 
complained of any visual disturbances. And he saic 
he didn't. 
MR. DeBRY: 
on that basis. 
I move all the testimony be stric\e 
That's an abstract question. 
MR. NEBEKER: It is not abstract. 
MR. DeBRY: You have got to ask about this ma~ .. 
MR. NEBEKER: I am asking whether or n?t hewr 
actually complained of any kind of visual distru ·· 
tand yo'Jr 
THE COURT: Apparently I doi:' t under~ h vou 
objection. He is asking a question to whic h 3 ~­
obj ected in the abstract, came up to the Bene ' 
-10-
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I have taken a proffer of proof in effect. If he 
said anything to him in taking his medical history 
about complaining of this eye problem? 
MR. NEBEKER: That's right. 
THE COURT: You still haven't answered my 
question. What is the ultimate opinion. 
MR. DeBRY: That's the danger. There is no 
ultimate question, I think, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well now, if you'd let me interro-
gate him, please. 
MR. NEBEKER: That would be the ultimate. 
That's the final question I am going to ask him. 
THE COURT: All right, what --
MR. NEBEKER: Because he will testify that --
THE COURT: You are only going to ask one more 
question, the one the objection is made to? 
MR. NEBEKER: That's about it. 
THE COURT: Well, you certainly can't have any 
objection to that. 
MR. DEBRY: Well, I move that it all be stricken 
insofar as he has stated no expert opinion. He has 
not said that arteriosclerosis probably caused this 
man's condition or even may have caused it. All he 
has testified to in the abstract is that sometimes 
in some people arteriosclerosis causes TIA and this 
man may have arteriosclerosis. 
And if anything permits the Jury to speculate, 
that's it. We can get a textbook up here to say 
arteriosclerosis sometimes causes TIA's. 
THE COURT: The Jury is at liberty to reject 
the testimony if thev want to. Is that the only 
question you. have left? 
MR. NEBEKER: I think that's about it. 
THE COURT: All right. We could have got over 
that easier. And the Jury will be back at ten 
after. Court will be in recess until that time. If 
you have any other problems come into Chambers. [R. 239-
243] 
-11-
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Thereupon the jury returned and defendant's attorney proceed,_ 
to ask exactly what he said he would. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. You 
may answer the last question. Do you want her to 
read it or do you want to reframe it? 
MR. NEBEKER: I will reframe it, Your Honor. 
Q. (By Mr. Nebeker) Dr. Hershgold, do you recall 
examining Mr. Jensen on May 3, 1976, at my 
request? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And at that time did you take a history from 
Mr. Jensen and talk to him about his physical 
complaints? 
A. I did. 
Q. And at that time do you recall him making any 
mention of any kind of visual disturbances 
when you talked to him? 
A. No, I don't. 
MR. NEBEKER: That's all, Your Honor. [R. 243· 
244] 
Obviously there was nothing inadmissible in Dr. 
Hershgold' s direct testimony. He merely testified to his 
medical findings regarding plaintiff's arteriosclerosis and tc 
the fact that plaintiff had not complained of any visual 
disturbances during the examination. Plaintiff's attorney's 
objection to Dr. Hershgold' s testimony seemed to anticipate' 
But no question seeking the Doctor's opinion on causation. 
such question was forthcoming by defendant's attorney. rncre:. 
I 
plaintiff's attorney then proceeded to delve into the area o. 
opinion which he had thought objectionable: 
-12-
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BY MR. DeBRY: 
Q As a matter of fact you have no opinion on 
whether or not his -- one way or other whether 
or not his transient ischemic attacks were 
caused by the arteriosclerosis or something 
else? 
A I have an opinion on that. 
Q You have an opinion? 
A Oh, yes. (R. 246] 
Obviously plaintiff's attorney was hoping to elicit 
from defendant's medical witness an admission that he didn't 
have an opinion concerning whether or not plaintiff's arterio-
sclerosis caused the TIA. Plaintiff's attorney took a calculated 
chance in opening up this area. This question backfired on 
him, and he didn't get the answer for which he had hoped. 
Consequently after opening the door into this causation area, 
plaintiff's attorney never did ask what the Doctor's opinion 
was. So on redirect examination defendant's attorney asked 
the natural question: 
BY MR. NEBEKER: 
Q I am not sure whether you were given the oppor-
tunity to state your opinion, Doctor. Did you 
feel that you had that opportunity to give your 
opinion? 
MR. DeBRY: Well, I object to that unless a 
proper foundation is made if he gives his opinion by 
hypothetical questions or assumes this fact. 
MR. NEBEKER: I am merely completing what was 
started by Mr. DeBry. 
-13-
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MR. DeBRY: It shouldn't be an abstract .. 
It should be a concrete opinion. 0 P1n1or, 
THE COU~T: Yc;iu as~e~ him whether or not he ha' 
a chance to .1.orm his opinion. And he said "Ye " · 
And you d~dn '. t ask him what it . was'. I sup~ose ~~ 
redirect it is proper. The obJ ection is overruled. 
Q (By Mr. Nebeker) What I want to ask you is 1; 
you do have an opinion and what it is. r want 
to phrase my question properly. 
A I don't know precisely exactly what is the 
cause of Mr. Jensen's blurred vision; that is 
or of the so-called transient ischemic attacks 
that he' s had. If he came to me with the stor. 
that I have heard now, my opinion would be · 
preponderantly that his transient ischernic 
attacks are due to his blood vessel disease. 
MR. NEBEKER: That's all, thank you. [R. 251-E 
Thus, plaintiff's Point One is not an accurate 
characterization of the trial. Defendant's counsel did not 
inject suprise testimony into the trial through Dr. Hershgold. 
Defendant's attorney only asked Dr. Hershgold for his finding: 
and observations which he made during the examination of the 
plaintiff. If plaintiff's attorney was surprised by any 
testimony, this surprise came in response to a question which 
plaintiff's attorney himself asked. This is not the kind of 
surprise testimony which entitles the plaintiff to a new wa; 
under Rule 59(a) (3) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 59 (a) (3) deals with the subject of New Trials 
and states that: 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of R~-' 
61, a new trial may be granted to all or any oft .. , 
-14-
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parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; 
* * * * 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary 
prudence could not have guarded against. 
As the court said in In Re Nash, 227 P.2d 270, 272, 
(Cal. 1951), "the surprise for which the courts have power to 
grant a new trial must be some condition or situation in which 
a party to a cause is unexpectedly placed, to his injury, 
without any default or negligence on his own . • . which 
ordinary prudence could not have guarded against." The court 
in State v. Anderson 290 NE.2d 510 (Ind. 1972) stated that 
the party claiming he is entitled to a new trial on the basis of 
surprise has a "heavy burden" of showing that ordinary prudence 
could not have guarded against the surprise. In this case 
plaintiff knew Dr. Hershgold was going to be called as an 
expert witness for the defendant, and he took Dr. Hershgold's 
deposition without inquiring into his opinion regarding causation 
of the TIA. Yet, when he cross-examined Dr. Hershgold, plaintiff's 
attorney proceeded to ask this witness questions regarding his 
opinion on this subject. With all the discovery tools available 
to plaintiff, he could easily have found out that Dr. Hershgold 
had an opinion on causation which was contrary to plaintiff's 
experts testimony. Forewarned, plaintiff's attorney could 
have refrained from asking opinion questions and this area 
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would never have been opened up. But since plaintiff• 5 attar:, 
did choose to open it up, he cannot now claim that he was 
surprised by the response to his questions. 
In Pacht v. Morris, 489 P.2d 29 (Ariz. 1971) defend; 
lost at trial and appealed claiming that they were surprised 
when plaintiff's doctor expressed an opinion as to the perman· 
ency of the injury. The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed fa 
trial court's denial of a new trial and found that defendants 
knew from the allegations of the complaint that plaintiff 
claimed permanent injuries and also knew that plaintiff would 
call the doctor as a witness. Defendants could have inquired 
into his opinion through deposition, but didn't. The court 
ruled that there was no surprise from testimony which went tc 
support the allegation of permanent injury which was maintain; 
by the plaintiff throughout the action. 
Similarly the Idaho Supreme Court stated in Papinea 
Idaho First National Bank, 258 P. 2d 755, 758, (Id. 1953) that 
"a party cannot claim surprise from the admission of testimor. 
competent, relevant, and material to the issues framed by the 
pleadings." This should be especially true in the case at ba: 
where the subject of Dr. Hershgold' s opinion was first raisei 
by the same party who is now claiming surprise. 
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II. THERE WAS NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN THE TRIAL COURT 
REFUSED TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUND THAT COUNSEL 
FOR PLAINTIFF WAS SURPRISED BY THE ANSWER TO A QUESTION 
WHICH HE ASKED 
Utah law is clear that the trial court has discretion 
over whether or not a new trial should be granted when surprise 
is claimed by the losing party. In Mecham v. Allen 1 Utah 2d 
79 262 P.2d 285 (1953) defendant claimed that he was surprised 
by the testimony of a witness produced on rebuttal regarding 
the facts of the accident. In affirming the trial court's 
refusal to grant a new trial, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"Whether a new trial should have been granted was a 
matter within the discretion of the trial court who 
was in a better position than we are to evaluate 
this evidence, determine its effect and whether it 
was a planned surprise. (262 P.2d at 293) 
Courts have always looked with suspicion upon surprise 
as a ground for a new trial. See Fletcher v. Pierceall 304 
P.2d 770 (Cal. 1956). In Bott v. Wender, 453 P.2d 100 (Kan. 
1969), the Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the trial court's 
denial of a new trial motion on the ground of surprise, and 
reiterated the overriding rule that the granting of a new 
trial on the grounds of surprise is discretionary on the part 
of the trial court, and will not be reversed unless a clear 
abuse of discretion is shown. 
Appellant cites the cases of Whitfield v. Dubricat, 
64 P.2d 960 (Cal. 1937) and Walker v. Distler, 296 P.2d 452 
(Id. 1956). In both of these cases, the trial judges exercised 
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their discretion, granted a new trial on the ground of suru 
1
, 
,r __ 
and the appellate courts refused to rule that they had abusec 
their discretion. Therefore these cases really support respc: 
dent's position that the trial judge's discretion will n~~ 
overturned on appeal unless a clear abuse of discretion is s'c:, 
The Honorable G. Hal Taylor, trial judge, heard the 
claimed surprise testimony in the context in which it arose. 
After the trial was over, he heard plaintiff's Motion for New 
Trial, for which plaintiff submitted a Memorandum which is 
very similar to his appellate brief. [R. 194-199] After 
considering the matter, Judge Taylor exercised his discretion 
and denied the motion. Defendant respectfully submits that 
under the facts and circumstances in this case, the action of 
the trial judge does not represent an abuse of discretion 
entitling plaintiff to a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
No surprise testimony was introduced into this case 
by defendant through Dr. Hershgold. Defendant's examination 
of Dr. Hershgold concerned only his findings during the inde· 
pendent medical examination, and plaintiff's complaints to hi: 
during said examination. If plaintiff was surprised by any 
testimony given by Dr. Hershgold, it was opinion testimony 
dur1. ng hi' s cross-examinatio: opened up by plaintiff's attorney 
. h he gets Plaintiff should not be heard to claim surprise w en 
the answer to his own question which he does not like. 
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The trial judge exercised his discretion and denied 
plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial. Plaintiff has produced no 
evidence or law showing that the trial judge abused his discre-
tion. Absence such a showing the trial judge's Order denying 
a new trial should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
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